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Tracking Tangible Asset Ownership and Provenance with Blockchain
ABSTRACT
Blockchain transactions are recorded in a shared and append-only repository that multiple parties
verify, validate, and agree-upon. While initially used to keep track of digital assets, blockchains
now track the ownership and provenance of tangible assets. An inherent challenge in using
blockchain for this task involves keeping the status of a tangible asset in the physical world in
sync with its non-fungible token on a blockchain. While several blockchains are already being
used in this manner, specific implementation details are fragmented. In response, this study
examines four stages of tracking tangible assets using a consortium’s permissioned blockchain,
including: design and governance of a blockchain, asset creation, asset transfer, and asset
retirement. Based on this analysis, this study proposes a framework of risk considerations and
control objectives to evaluate the extent to which a unique blockchain serves as a reliable
transaction repository for tracking the ownership and provenance of tangible assets.

Keywords: blockchain; provenance; ownership; tangible asset; non-fungible tokens.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A growing number of blockchain implementations demonstrate that the technology can
help companies track the ownership and provenance of tangible assets (Higginson, Nadeau, and
Rajgopal 2019). For example, Walmart uses blockchain to track the provenance of some food
items (Hyperledger 2020a), while Everledger tracks the provenance of diamonds, wine & spirits,
and luxury goods (Austin 2020). In many cases, non-fungible tokens (NFTs) on a blockchain
represent unique tangible assets. 1 However, an inherent challenge is how to keep an NFT and its
tangible asset in sync (McKinsey & Company 2018) as discrepancies can lead to issues with
inventory valuation and/or conflicts in ownership claims. To date, details on how existing
blockchains address this challenge are sparse. In response, this study examines four essential
stages of tracking the ownership and provenance of tangible assets with blockchain, focusing on
assets to which an identification (ID) tag can be directly attached. 2 Following the approach used
by Sheldon (2021), the objective of this study is to develop a framework of risks and control
objectives to evaluate the extent to which a permissioned blockchain used by a consortium serves
as a reliable transaction repository for tracking tangible assets. 3,4
Blockchain provides a self-contained environment that enables exchanges of value online
and resists threats from the outside world (Coyne and McMickle 2017; Warburg, Wagner, and
NFTs “identify something or someone in a unique way” (Ethereum Foundation 2022), which can include digital or
physical assets (Entriken, Shirley, Evans, and Sachs 2018). On Ethereum, an open-source blockchain commonly
used as a code base to create permissioned blockchains, these tokens are defined under Ethereum Request for
Comment 721, Non-Fungible Token Standard (Ethereum.org 2021).
2
Assets with ID tags attached to only packaging and/or shipping containers are beyond the scope of this study.
3
While this study focuses on risks and controls specific to using a permissioned blockchain to track tangible assets,
there are other risks and controls to consider when evaluating an entire blockchain ecosystem (e.g., private key
security, change management, system interfaces). Interested readers can see COSO (2020) for a broad range of
blockchain risks and internal controls, and Sheldon (2019) for information technology general controls (ITGCs)
relevant to a permissioned blockchain.
4
This study refers to blockchain as a distributed transaction “repository” rather than “ledger” to convey the fact that
it tracks details about tangible assets beyond simple exchanges (i.e., debits and credits). The notion of a distributed
transaction repository remains consistent with terminology used in a recent publication from the International
Organization of Standards (ISO 2020). I thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
1
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Serres 2019). However, when used to track tangible assets, a blockchain ecosystem requires
external inputs to keep the physical and digital worlds in sync. While the practice of recording
digital representations of tangible assets is not new (e.g., scanning barcodes), blockchain enables
end-to-end tracking of NFTs from asset origin, through exchanges in the supply chain, and
ultimately between different owners using a repository that is shared, append-only, verified,
validated, and agreed-upon by key stakeholders. This tracking allows companies to maintain
real-time views into their own tangible asset holdings and to view records of each asset’s
provenance. 5 A reliable record of provenance is important to establish an asset’s origin and
authenticity, which can have a direct impact on its valuation. For example, the retail value of a
smartphone will likely decrease if customers discover that its raw materials include conflict
minerals (Hyperledger 2020b).
While a single enterprise might implement a blockchain to track tangible assets, 6 parties
in a horizontal or vertical ecosystem can also form a consortium to accomplish this task (Deloitte
2019). Various parties typically have an interest in proving an asset’s authenticity throughout its
life (e.g., manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, customer). Given the level of control a consortium
would want to maintain over its blockchain, a permissioned (rather than permissionless) design
would allow only authorized users to submit transactions, verify/validate transactions, participate
in the consensus to add transactions to the repository, and maintain a copy of the blockchain
repository (Drescher 2017; IBM 2019; Warburg et al. 2019; Stein Smith and Castonguay 2020). 7

Permissions to view content on a blockchain can be defined at the participant level. This study focuses on
consortium blockchains with authorized participants, and assumes all participants can view all data and records.
6
Given that blockchains were initially conceived to avoid centralized control (e.g., Nakamoto 2008), a blockchain
owned and controlled by a single enterprise might be challenged on its classification as a blockchain.
7
This study makes several assumptions about the types of transactions that would be recorded in a blockchain used
to track tangible assets. Specifically, the term “transaction” in this study can refer a financial exchange (e.g., of
digital currency) or an event (e.g., the creation, sale, modification (enhancement or damage), or retirement of an
asset, as well as any asset recertifications). In terms of asset value, this blockchain would track historical cost
established as part of sales or modifications, but would not be used to track asset market values or book values. As
5
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Such control makes permissioned blockchains appealing in a business setting (AICPA and CPA
Canada 2017; Dai and Vasarhelyi 2017; Lewis 2018; Warburg et al. 2019), as evidenced by the
prominent permissioned blockchains currently being used to track tangible assets (e.g., IBM
Food Trust and Everledger). 8 As such, this study focuses on permissioned blockchains used by
consortiums to track the ownership and provenance of tangible assets.
This study follows the Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM) (Hevner, March,
Park, and Ram 2004; Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, and Chatterjee 2007), as applied in an
accounting information systems (AIS) setting by Geerts (2011). Several recent AIS studies also
apply this methodology (e.g., Nehmer and Srivastava 2016; Appelbaum and Nehmer 2017;
Rozario and Thomas 2019; Appelbaum and Nehmer 2020; Sheldon 2021). DSRM includes six
phases: (1) Problem identification and motivation, (2) Define the objectives of a solution, (3)
Design and development, (4) Demonstration, (5) Evaluation, and (6) Communication (Geerts
2011). The problem identified in this study (Phase 1) is that blockchain can be used as the record
of tangible asset ownership and provenance, but the extant research does not offer a framework
to evaluate the extent to which blockchain serves as a reliable repository for tracking tangible
assets. As motivation to study this problem, blockchain users might rely on incorrect information
from a technology labeled a “truth machine” (Casey and Vigna 2018). However, a blockchain
deemed reliable to track tangible assets can provide strong support for (1) an asset’s origin and
authenticity, (2) an owner’s claim to the asset, and (3) key accounting documentation about the
asset (e.g., purchase date and cost) (Hoare 2015). The question of reliability can be
solved/clarified (Phase 2) by examining the process of tracking tangible assets with blockchain,

such, this study assumes that more involved accounting procedures (e.g., depreciation and mark-to-market) would
be handled separately by a firm’s internal accounting system(s).
8
Recent arguments suggest, when designed properly, permissioned blockchains can achieve higher decentralization
of control than permissionless blockchains (e.g., Bakos, Halaburda, and Mueller-Bloch 2021).

3
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then creating a framework of risks and control objectives relevant to each stage of the asset’s life
(i.e., creation, transfer, and retirement); both tasks are performed in this study (Phase 3). As it is
not always feasible for individual studies to address every aspect of the DSRM (Peffers et al.
2007), this study does not demonstrate or evaluate its framework in a live setting (Phases 4 and
5). 9 However, a Big-4 practitioner working on that firm’s blockchain product provided
suggestions on ways to improve the framework, which are incorporated in the final version.
Furthermore, key open issues with the framework appear in Section IV, Research Opportunities.
Finally, writing this study accomplishes communication (Phase 6). Table 1 provides a mapping
and further discussion of how this study follows the DSRM.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
To develop a framework of risks and control objectives, this study examines four stages
of tracking a tangible asset’s ownership and provenance using blockchain. Stage One, Design
and Governance Considerations, addresses technical details and key processes a consortium’s
charter should define before implementing a blockchain to track tangible assets. This stage also
discusses three pervasive supporting processes: privileged access provisioning, smart contract
deployment, and smart contract retirement. 10 Stage Two, Asset Creation, examines the creation
of a tangible asset, participants’ verification and validation of the creation, and minting (i.e.,
creating) the asset’s NFT. Stage Three, Asset Transfer, considers the transfer/sale of an asset,
participants’ verification and validation of the transfer, and the role of smart contracts in
transfers. This stage also considers the process to recertify the quality/condition of a tangible

While publicly available documentation for how some blockchains track the ownership and provenance of tangible
assets is more thorough (e.g., the IBM Food Trust, www.ibm.com/food), proprietary details are not made public. As
such, it is not currently feasible to demonstrate (i.e., Phase 4) the framework against one of these implementations.
10
References to “smart contracts” throughout this study are interchangeable with “decentralized applications” (or
Dapps), which are applications on a blockchain built by combining several smart contracts.
9
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asset and attach this recertification to the respective NFT. The final stage, Asset Retirement,
considers the retirement of both the tangible asset and its NFT. If the risks posed throughout
these four stages are addressed, blockchain has the potential to provide a reliable record of
ownership and provenance for a tangible asset as it moves between owners/custodians. However,
even if all of these risks are addressed, some traditional procedures remain applicable such as
periodically confirming the existence/custody of an asset and inspecting the asset’s physical
condition (and applying valuation adjustments).
This study is important to practitioners (i.e., managers, accountants, and internal/external
auditors), standard setters, and researchers. For practitioners, the study proposes a framework of
risks and control objectives to evaluate the extent to which a consortium’s permissioned
blockchain serves as a reliable repository for tangible assets. 11 Here, reliability should increase
when the consortium addresses more of the identified risks and implements controls to achieve
the proposed control objectives. If a tangible asset and its NFT are not kept in sync, practitioners
could be confronted with issues of (1) whether physical possession or the blockchain record
serves as a more appropriate claim of asset ownership and/or (2) unexpected impairments if the
market value of the asset falls below its cost due to being identified as counterfeit or having an
unreliable provenance. This study also informs standard setters as they develop guidance on risks
that auditors must address when evaluating the reliability of an asset’s ownership/provenance as
recorded on a blockchain. Finally, this study extends existing research on blockchain in the
accounting literature (e.g., Dai and Vasarhelyi 2017; Appelbaum and Nehmer 2020; Sheldon
2021) by examining the creation, transfer, and retirement of an asset that exists both in the
physical world and as an NFT, and proposes directions for future research in this area.
The framework proposes control objectives, but not control activities nor testing procedures to evaluate control
activities, as auditors would need to identify/develop these based on the unique blockchain implementation.

11
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II. BACKGROUND
Accounting Research on Blockchain
A growing body of research examines blockchain and its implications for the accounting
profession (e.g., Coyne and McMickle 2017; Cong, Du, and Vasarhelyi 2018; Rozario and
Thomas 2019; Sheldon 2019; Liu, Wu, and Xu 2020; Stein Smith and Castonguay 2020). Three
recently published works are particularly relevant to this study.
Dai and Vasarhelyi (2017) discuss how blockchain can be used alongside other emerging
technologies such as Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. Specifically, objects from the physical
world can be virtually represented in a mirror world, with their physical “conditions, locations,
surrounding environment, history, and activities” continuously updated in the mirror world by
transmissions from IoT or similar devices (Dai and Vasarhelyi 2017, 15). Building from Dai and
Vasarhelyi (2017), the current study examines the process used to ensure that a tangible asset and
its NFT remain in sync so a reliable record of asset ownership/provenance can be maintained by
a blockchain.
Appelbaum and Nehmer (2020) discuss the challenge of blockchain participants being
able to observe/verify an event in the physical world, and then contribute to the blockchain
consensus vote as to whether the event actually occurred. They argue that a more restricted
internal private blockchain would be best suited for such challenges, because “if participants are
not able to directly verify for themselves that the blockchain activity as recorded accurately
represents the physical activity or asset, consensus may not occur” (Appelbaum and Nehmer
2020, 10). Based on this argument, the current study focuses on tracking tangible assets with
permissioned consortium blockchains. Furthermore, this study builds off Appelbaum and

6
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Nehmer (2020) by examining the various points in a tangible asset’s life when an event in the
physical world needs to be recorded as part of the asset’s provenance on a blockchain.
Sheldon (2021) examines the use of oracles to observe events in the physical world and
make this information available on a blockchain. Oracles collect data from various sources to
generate information about a tangible asset using devices such as IoT or radio frequency
identification (RFID). The author highlights several risks of using hardware devices as a data
source such as whether they remain attached to the intended asset, they are configured to capture
the intended occurrence, the devices store data securely, and these data are completely and
accurately transmitted to the relevant oracle. These external data source considerations inform
the current study as it examines blockchain vulnerability to exogenous inputs and processes.
Blockchain Technical Considerations
Today, the owner of a tangible asset typically maintains the only record of an asset’s
provenance, meaning subsequent buyers must trust this record or exert effort to validate the
seller’s claims. 12 With blockchain, participants work to maintain a complete provenance that is
shared, append-only, verified, validated, and agreed-upon. 13 If a party chooses to leave the
blockchain, remaining participants maintain the asset’s provenance. Furthermore, participants
have incentives to behave honestly, as dishonest behavior can result in losing access to the
blockchain or business partnerships established along the supply chain.
Blockchains use devices such as IoT and RFID to integrate with the physical world (Dai
and Vasarhelyi 2017). If controlled properly, these devices make it possible for an NFT and
tangible asset to remain in sync. As the digital representation of an asset, an NFT can carry

In some cases, a central party might also maintain asset records, such as when CARFAX collects oil change,
owner, accident, and damage history for a vehicle from sources such as state Departments of Motor Vehicles.
13
Here, and throughout the remainder of this study, discussion of blockchain functionality is specific to
permissioned blockchains used by consortiums (unless otherwise specified).
12

7

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3669326

specific attributes (e.g., asset name, serial number, date of creation) and attach to various
(re)certifications (e.g., asset origin, quality, or condition) (De Poli 2021). Furthermore, an NFT
can be transferred to a new owner, a process typically aided by smart contracts that release
payment to the seller once the buyer takes possession of the tangible asset (Coyne and McMickle
2017). Each time an NFT moves between parties or attaches to a (re)certification, blockchain
adds the transaction to a chronological history of the asset’s provenance.
Several configurable features also make blockchain an appropriate repository for tangible
assets. For example, parties running a blockchain can pre-define in its protocol and/or in
individual smart contracts the evidence required to verify and validate transactions. These parties
can also define what proportion of participants must come to a consensus that a transaction is
valid before it can be added to the shared repository (Warburg et al. 2019). 14 Clearly defining
what constitutes appropriate evidence and consensus is critical because transactions added to the
blockchain repository are difficult to modify or delete.
Given the discussed features, several permissioned blockchains now exist to track
tangible assets. However, specific implementation details are not widely available. In response,
the following section examines essential stages of tracking tangible assets with blockchain.

III. STAGES AND EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
This study takes the position that tracking tangible assets using blockchain involves four
stages. The first stage includes design and governance considerations of a blockchain, while the
second stage considers the creation of a tangible asset and its associated NFT. Stage three

Warburg et al. (2019) define a blockchain consortium as “a blockchain where the consensus process is controlled
by a pre-selected set of nodes; for example, one might imagine a consortium of 15 financial institutions, each of
which operates a node, and of which ten must sign every block for the block to be valid” (p. 350).

14
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involves transfers and recertifications of an asset, while the fourth and final stage addresses asset
retirement.
Stage One – Design and Governance Considerations
The design and governance stage addresses the consortium’s charter, including the
processes it defines to provide permissioned access and create and retire smart contracts. 15
Consortium Charter
A critical component in the creation and continued operation of a consortium is its
charter. Formalizing a charter helps ensure that key governance and operational details about the
consortium and its blockchain are clearly defined and agreed to by all participants and member
organizations. 16 While the charter can include a wide range of details, those most critical to this
study include the blockchain technical details and the processes used to support blockchain
operations.
In terms of technical details, the charter should define the types of permissioned access
rights that exist on a blockchain, such as abilities to (1) verify the occurrence of transactions, (2)
submit transactions, (3) validate transactions and participate in the consensus to add transactions
to the repository, and/or (4) maintain a copy of the blockchain repository (Drescher 2017; IBM
2019; Warburg et al. 2019; Stein Smith and Castonguay 2020). The charter should also specify
which participants may possess permissioned access rights or combinations of permissioned
access rights. Furthermore, a charter needs to define criteria for selecting oracles, acceptable
forms of evidence to verify and validate the creation/transfer/retirement of a tangible asset, and
Stage one does not discuss all possible governance considerations, but rather those that are uniquely important in
the context of using a consortium’s permissioned blockchain to track the ownership and provenance of tangible
assets. For a broader discussion of governance considerations, see Stein Smith and Castonguay (2020).
16
This study distinguishes consortium member organizations from network participants, in that member
organizations create and sustain the consortium, while network participants perform activities on the consortium’s
blockchain. As such, network participants can be from member organizations or can be authorized outsiders.
References to “participants” are shorthand for “network participants”.
15
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the minimum level of consensus required to record transactions to the blockchain repository. For
NFTs, the charter should specify the attributes that must be assigned to each token (e.g., tangible
asset’s name, ID tag, serial/model number, creation date, creation location, and picture), which
attributes are only visible to restricted parties, and the data standards for assigning/attaching
information to NFTs (i.e., for interoperability purposes).
Consortium charters also must define the processes used to support and maintain the
blockchain. To begin, a defined process should exist for how to request, approve, and implement
logical access, including who has the authority to request, approve, and/or implement the access.
The charter should also define the process used to design, test, and implement new smart
contracts, specify who has the authority to approve and deploy new smart contracts, and define
how to remove/avoid retired smart contracts. Additionally, the charter should specify when smart
contracts should be audited, how they should be audited, and who may perform these audits. It is
also necessary to define the parties allowed to recertify the quality/condition of different assets
and the process for attaching this recertification to the respective NFT. Further, the charter
should include a resolution process to resolve discrepancies between the physical world (i.e.,
who possesses the tangible asset) and digital world (i.e., who controls the NFT). Finally, there
must be a process for how to amend the charter, including how many member organizations must
approve the change(s). While all processes are essential to support and maintain the blockchain,
at least three require further examination due to their high frequency and pervasive nature:
provisioning permissioned access, implementing smart contracts, and retiring smart contracts.
Provisioning Permissioned Access
In contrast to permissionless blockchains, permissioned blockchain participants are
typically fewer in number, have known identities, and are explicitly granted access to the

10
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blockchain (IBM 2019; Warburg et al. 2019). Each participant has the potential to exert
relatively more influence on blockchain operations, which increases the need to tightly control
who obtains permissioned access rights. 17 The access provisioning process should involve an
authorized party submitting a formal/documented request for a separate participant’s
new/modified/removed access rights, which should then be reviewed by a separate authorized
party or committee to determine whether the requested access is appropriate based on rules set
forth in the charter (Sheldon 2019). Part of this evaluation should include whether the new access
(1) concentrates higher-power abilities among too few participants and (2) assigns the least
privilege necessary for a participant to perform their role in the ecosystem (ISACA 2019). For
example, if a participant’s role is to verify the creation of a tangible asset, it might be appropriate
to allow this party to submit evidence of creation to the blockchain, but not validate the event or
vote in its consensus. 18 If approved, access should be implemented by an authorized security
administrator. Finally, an expedited process should be in place for emergency removal of access
from identified/potential bad actors (ISACA 2019).
While access rights determine who has specific authorizations on a blockchain, smart
contracts create much of the on-chain functionality available to these participants.
Implementing and Retiring Smart Contracts
Smart contracts are short software programs on a blockchain available for one-time or
repeated uses. In this study, smart contracts act as escrow agents that hold the buyer’s and
seller’s assets until certain conditions are achieved as part of an exchange agreement, and also
Stein Smith and Castonguay (2020) point out that “admitting an unprepared or lower quality member can lead to
information issues” that harm the other members (p. 122). The authors emphasize that “enterprises must determine,
prior to the acceptance of network members, how the identities of different network members – individuals or
institutions – will be verified and authenticated prior to being admitted as nodes to the private blockchain” (Stein
Smith and Castonguay 2020, 122).
18
The issues discussed in this paragraph allude to questions of appropriate segregation of duties, which are later
discussed in Section IV, Research Opportunities.
17
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mint NFTs that represent tangible assets. Once deployed, smart contracts are difficult to modify
and have a unique address to call their functionality. Furthermore, smart contracts that execute
are nearly impossible to reverse. As such, smart contracts must be subject to robust design,
development, testing, approval, and release processes. 19 It is also possible that, as operations
change, legacy smart contracts will need to be replaced by new smart contracts that are more
tailored to current needs. By calling a smart contract that is no longer relevant, participants are
exposed to the risk that the smart contract does not adhere to current regulatory/contractual
agreements and that assets might be transferred to an unintended party. It is therefore necessary
to define processes to sunset retired or outdated smart contracts.
Level of adherence to the following control objectives can help reveal the extent to which
risks are mitigated in Stage One, Design and Governance Considerations. Specific control
activities to achieve these objectives will vary based on the unique blockchain implementation:
•

Control Objective #1.1 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that the consortium has
a charter in place that is agreed to by all original and subsequent network participants
and member organizations. The charter should address technical details about the
blockchain and any relevant processes used to support blockchain operations.

•

Control Objective #1.2 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that the (level of)
permissioned access granted to network participants remains appropriate.

•

Control Objective #1.3 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that smart contracts
deployed to the blockchain are subject to a formal design, development, testing,
approval, and release process.

•

Control Objective #1.4 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that smart contracts are
retired/blocked when they are no longer applicable to the consortium’s operations.

See the appendix for the framework that maps these control objectives to risk considerations.
Stage Two – Asset Creation

Sheldon (2019) examines the specifics of smart contract development and change management processes in
evaluating information technology general controls (ITGCs) in a blockchain environment.

19
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In general, ID tags can be attached to (1) the physical asset, (2) the asset’s packaging, or
(3) the asset’s shipping container. Given the heightened risk that an asset can be separated from
its ID tag when the tag is attached to the asset’s packaging or shipping container, this study
focuses on tangible assets directly attached to an ID tag.
A wide variety of tangible assets can be directly attached to an ID tag (e.g., a large
industrial stamping machine or a car). However, the benefits of tracking tangible assets with
blockchain become more apparent when (1) it is important to demonstrate the authenticity/origin
of the asset, and/or (2) the asset will be sold/transferred several times throughout its life. A large
industrial stamping machine might not benefit from blockchain tracking as buyers likely
purchase the machine from the manufacturer and it will not be sold frequently throughout its life.
However, a car will likely be sold several times throughout its life and the authenticity/origin of
component parts remains important. Here, blockchain can track the authenticity/origin of
component parts (e.g., a separate NFT for the frame, engine, and body), and any sale/transfer of
the asset as an assembled unit. 20 Given the importance of ID tags to this process, various types of
ID tags and associated risks must be considered.
Asset Identification Tags
The asset ID tag plays a key role in uniquely identifying a tangible asset and keeping it in
sync with its NFT. One of the simpler forms of ID tags remains a one-dimensional barcode (i.e.,
a barcode with parallel vertical lines of varying widths), but this format limits the amount of
information a tag can directly store/represent about an asset. More information can be

Smart contracts provide a solution to track the origin/authenticity of component parts used to create an assembled
and finished tangible asset (cf. EY 2021). Specifically, when parts are combined, a smart contract can burn (i.e.,
destroy) the component NFTs and mint (i.e., create) a single new NFT to represent the in-process or completed
asset. A blockchain repository records the trail/log for these types of activities, and thus maintains evidence about
the origin/authenticity of a finished product’s component parts.

20
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stored/represented within a confined space using a two-dimensional barcode, such as a QR code
(Baum, n.d.). RFID and near-field communication tags more commonly track specific
information about a unique item (Dai and Vasarhelyi 2016), such as with supply chain smart
label tracking (Baum, n.d.). Other methods are also emerging to uniquely identify tangible assets,
such as taking high resolution images, recording specific metrics and attributes (Warburg et al.
2019), using synthetic DNA (e.g., Everledger), 21 or placing quantum dot security inks on an
asset (e.g., Ubiquitous Quantum Dots). 22
Several features of asset ID tags and their implementation should be considered. To
begin, what data does the tag store, can the data be used to uniquely identify the specific tangible
asset, and can this data be changed in an unauthorized manner? Next, is it possible for data on
the tag to be copied to a different tag and attached to a different asset in an unauthorized manner
(e.g., creating fraudulent assets or spoofing an RFID tag)? Similarly, how permanently is the tag
attached to the asset, and is it possible for the ID tag to be removed and placed on a different
asset without showing signs of tampering or misuse? Once these issues are addressed, the next
step is to verify details about the asset’s creation.
Verify and Validate Creation of Tangible Asset
Tracking tangible assets with blockchain presents the challenge of how to observe when
something happens in the physical world and then convince participants that the event occurred
(Appelbaum and Nehmer 2020). As part of this, only authorized and appropriate participants
and/or oracles (per the charter) should be allowed to verify the creation of a tangible asset and
submit this information to the blockchain. It is important to consider how this party observes the

21
22

For more information on Everledger, see: www.everledger.io
For more information on Ubiquitous Quantum Dots, see: https://ubiqd.com/security/
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asset’s creation, and whether this observation is persuasive in the specific circumstance.
Evidence of this observation might include one or more of the following:
•

A live or recorded video, from a stationary camera or drone, showing the creation of the
asset at a specific location (Appelbaum and Nehmer 2020),

•

A neutral third party observing and certifying the creation (Campbell, Omietański, and
Southwell 2018),

•

For a geographically concentrated blockchain, live observation of the creation by
participants (Appelbaum and Nehmer 2020). 23

It is also relevant to consider how a blockchain receives evidence of the tangible asset’s creation.
For example, if a smart device observes the creation, is the device protected from unauthorized
access (i.e., physical access to the device and logical access to its data and software) (Sheldon
2019). Furthermore, does the device directly interface with a blockchain node or does
information about the transaction get passed to another intermediary that should also be
evaluated for security issues, similar to how Sheldon (2021) describes the risks of intermediary
blockchain oracles. Finally, one must consider how the observer correctly routes evidence of
asset creation to the smart contract that mints an asset’s NFT.
With creation verified and evidence of this event submitted to the blockchain,
participants must review this evidence to determine whether it validates creation. Here, an
important consideration includes what forms of evidence participants are allowed to use to
validate the creation of different types of tangible assets, and how blockchain enforces this
requirement (e.g., by protocol or smart contracts). Also, at this point, consider different ways a
specific blockchain achieves consensus. For example, some blockchains require that only a small
Plausibly, there could be a hierarchy of evidence, such that certain forms can stand alone while others must be
combined with one or more other forms.
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number or proportion of participants approve a block for it to be valid, increasing the risk of
incorrectly recording the creation of an asset due to error or fraud. However, this risk might be
offset by requiring higher quality and/or more objective forms of evidence to validate an asset’s
creation. Finally, it is important to evaluate how the relevant smart contract enforces the required
level of consensus among authorized participants before it mints an asset’s NFT, as any failure to
enforce this consensus could result in minting an unauthorized NFT.
Assign Attributes to Non-Fungible Token
Smart contracts should require that certain attributes about a tangible asset (e.g., the
asset’s name, ID tag number/reference, serial/model number, creation date/location, and picture)
be assigned to its NFT as part of minting. Assigning these attributes as part of NFT minting is
critical because delays in assigning attributes can lead to errors or inaccuracies, which could
introduce challenges in later defending the asset’s authenticity. In some situations, it might also
be appropriate for the manufacturing plant or other origin to be inspected, certified, and/or
otherwise licensed to demonstrate authenticity of the asset. For example, the IBM Food Trust
blockchain tracks certifications and licenses that “a facility is properly inspected, that livestock
have been treated according to law, that a supplier is legally able to do business, and that a farm
is certified as conforming to industry standards” (IBM 2019). Only authorized parties should
submit certification/inspection/license records to the blockchain, and these records should
include the date of certification/inspection/licensing, the time period covered, and how long these
should be considered valid (IBM 2019). It is also necessary to determine how
certification/inspection/license details are properly recorded and submitted to the blockchain, as
well as how they are attached to a specific NFT.
Maintaining Asset ID Tag
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Asset ID tags should be regularly maintained given their role as the physical unique
identifier that associates a tangible asset with its NFT. Here, it is relevant to consider how long
the tag will be usable relative to the life of the tangible asset and what procedures are in place to
maintain the tag so as to sustain a continuous link between the tangible asset and its NFT. As this
relates to RFID and near-field communication tags, also consider whether the tags are active and
have their own power source, or if they are passive and require energy from the scanning device
to share information (Baum, n.d.). Although all tags run the risk of damage over time, active tags
also run the risk that the battery or other power source might fully deplete, thus preventing the
tag from sharing information. To replace an ID tag, procedures should be in place to
decommission the legacy tag and associate the replacement tag with its existing NFT.
Devices other than ID tags can also help accumulate details about a tangible asset
throughout its life, such as IoT devices.
Internet-of-Things Devices
IoT represents a broad category of technologies that includes the asset ID tags already
discussed, as well as other devices that provide “computing functionality, data storage, and
network connectivity for equipment that previously lacked them” (NIST 2019, iv). For example,
when shipping a piece of art, IoT devices can uniquely identify the asset (e.g., RFID tag),
monitor its surrounding temperature and humidity (e.g., temperature and humidity sensors),
determine the speed at which is it being moving (e.g., accelerometer sensor), monitor changes in
its physical orientation (e.g., angular rate sensor), and pinpoint the origin, path, and final
destination of its journey (e.g., GPS device). When combined, IoT devices can provide an
expansive history of an asset’s physical status, which blockchain can record as part of the asset’s
provenance.
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IoT devices pose several unique risks. To begin, some IoT devices include network
interface capabilities, meaning the device can interact over a communications network (e.g., WiFi or Bluetooth) (Dai, Zheng, and Zhang 2019; NIST 2019). If an IoT device includes network
connectivity, it becomes vulnerable to the collection of risks and threats that other internetconnected devices face (e.g., cyberattacks, loss of control of the device, unauthorized changes to
stored data) (NIST 2019). In these cases, all custodians of an asset should have hardware and
software internal controls in place to protect the device (Sheldon 2019). Furthermore, IoT
devices must be properly configured to observe and capture an intended event, store data
securely, and transmit collected information completely and accurately to an intermediary device
or directly to a blockchain (Sheldon 2021).
Level of adherence to the following control objectives can help reveal the extent to which
risks are mitigated in Stage Two, Asset Creation. Specific control activities to achieve these
objectives will vary based on the unique blockchain implementation:
•

Control Objective #2.1 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that when a tangible
asset is created, it is attached to a secure asset identification tag that uniquely identifies
the tangible asset.

•

Control Objective #2.2 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that only authorized
network participants or oracles (1) verify the creation of a tangible asset and (2) submit
evidence of this event to the smart contract used to mint the asset’s non-fungible token.

•

Control Objective #2.3 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that participants
validate the creation of a tangible asset using approved forms of evidence.

•

Control Objective #2.4 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that network
participants must reach the required level of consensus on the tangible asset’s creation
before the smart contract will mint the asset’s non-fungible token.

•

Control Objective #2.5 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that the smart contract
accurately assigns all required attributes to the non-fungible token upon its minting (e.g.,
asset name, identification tag number/reference, serial/model number, creation
date/location, and picture).
18
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•

Control Objective #2.6 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that the asset
identification tag is serviced regularly. If the tag must be replaced, the legacy tag is
decommissioned and the new tag is associated with the respective non-fungible token.

•

Control Objective #2.7 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that IoT devices used to
track tangible assets adhere to the same controls as asset identification tags, and also
maintain secure network connectivity, data storage, and configurations.

See the appendix for the framework that maps these control objectives to risk considerations, and
Figure 1 for an example of a tangible asset moving through Stage Two, Asset Creation. 24
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Stage Three – Asset Transfer
While asset transfers can happen between many different parties along a supply chain or
between owners of a finished product, the critical element from a recording perspective remains
the same in each exchange: is the asset released by the seller the same as the asset received and
paid for by the buyer? Stage Three, Asset Transfer, considers the elements of a transfer and the
risks that threaten a blockchain’s ability to provide a reliable record of these events. This study
assumes that a smart contract assists in transfers by releasing the NFT and payment once
physical transfer of an asset takes place. 25
Asset Recertification

For aggregated assets (i.e., those comprised of several component parts/inputs), it might not be feasible for all
manufacturing/sourcing parties to tag each component part and/or participate in the consortium’s permissioned
blockchain (e.g., due to contributing low-cost parts or not having the necessary technology resources). In these
situations, it will be important for designated parties in the consortium to tag remaining component parts (of
meaningful value) and submit any required evidence to the blockchain to create the associated NFT(s). By doing so,
this party stakes its own reputation to signal to the rest of the consortium, supply chain, and consumer market that
the component parts are authentic. Similar to the underlying incentive structures in popular consensus protocols
(e.g., proof-of-work and proof-of-stake), this party has incentives to maintain a reliable blockchain repository as any
signs of fraud or tampering would hurt its own financial condition.
25
Given the exchange of consideration, assets sold for scrap would follow the Asset Transfer process.
24
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As a best practice, an expert should recertify the quality/condition of a long-lived tangible
asset after it undergoes a significant change (e.g., a new engine) or prior to a transfer/sale. 26,27
The guidance/processes outlined in a consortium’s charter should be followed as part of any
recertification, including (1) who may serve as an expert to recertify different assets, (2) how to
identify this expert (and have the buyer/seller agree on this expert if part of a transfer/sale), (3)
required credentials of the recertifying expert, and (4) how to resolve any disagreements about
the expert’s recertification conclusion. Evidence of recertification (e.g., documentation and
photos) should be uploaded to the blockchain by an appropriate party, such as the expert, and
attached to the respective NFT. 28,29 Furthermore, if the expert determines that the asset should be
retired prior to a transfer/sale, this status should be submitted to the smart contract used to
facilitate the exchange, which should trigger the return of payment and NFT to their original
owners. In such cases, a “retired” status should be attached to the NFT and/or the NFT should be
burned (i.e., destroyed).
Verify and Validate the Transfer of a Tangible Asset
The process to verify and validate the transfer of a tangible asset is similar to the process
used to verify and validate its creation. For example, only authorized participants and/or oracles
should verify the transfer and submit evidence of this event to the blockchain. Such evidence
might include one or more of the following:

This does not recertify the asset’s authenticity, as that is demonstrated by its provenance on the blockchain.
Owners that make significant changes to assets that will not be imminently transferred/sold should still have the
assets recertified on a timely basis (i.e., not wait until the next transfer/sale) so that the provenance accurately
reflects what change happened, when it occurred, and when it was recorded to the blockchain/attached to the NFT.
28
While it is possible for evidence of recertification to be kept off-chain, this presents risks of the evidence being
manipulated, destroyed/lost, or not made available to participants. This study assumes the recertifying expert
uploads this documentation, and has incentives to upload this documentation, to the blockchain on a timely basis.
29
For example, Honeywell Aerospace displays recertification documents for used parts on its GoDirect Trade
blockchain as part of creating a marketplace for used airplane parts (Hyperledger 2020c).
26
27
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•

A live or recorded video, from a stationary camera or drone, showing the delivery of an
asset to a specific location (Appelbaum and Nehmer 2020),

•

A neutral third party observing and certifying the transfer (Campbell et al. 2018),

•

For a geographically concentrated blockchain, live observation of the transfer by
participants (Appelbaum and Nehmer 2020),

•

The recipient scanning the asset’s ID tag to acknowledge possession of the asset for a
transfer (Christidis and Devetsikiotis 2016),

•

A GPS device attached to the asset showing the asset arrived at a specific location for a
transfer (Christidis and Devetsikiotis 2016).

Similar to asset creation, it is necessary to consider how a verifying party/device submits
evidence of transfer to the blockchain (i.e., directly or via an intermediary), and how a smart
contract receives notice of a completed transfer.
Once the transfer has been verified and evidence of this event has been submitted to the
blockchain, participants must validate the transfer. Similar to asset creation, this involves
reviewing evidence of the transfer and determining whether it validates the event. Once again, it
remains important to consider the forms of evidence participants may use to validate the transfer
of different types of tangible assets, and how a blockchain enforces requirements for specific
evidence. Finally, also consider the consensus required to record a transfer (per the charter) and
how the relevant smart contract enforces this consensus before it transfers the NFT.
Smart Contract Assisted Transfer
As mentioned, a smart contract likely acts as an escrow service to assist in asset transfers.
Here, the seller sends the respective NFT to the smart contract, and the buyer sends payment to
the smart contract. Once participants verify and validate the transfer (as previously described),
21
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the smart contract releases the NFT to the buyer and payment to the seller. Here, it is necessary
to consider how the smart contract is set up to collect sufficient payment from the buyer and the
correct NFT from the seller. Furthermore, the trigger event used to release the payment and NFT
should be subject to verification and validation by participants. Finally, consider when this
trigger event must happen (i.e., does the smart contract remain active indefinitely), and if not by
a specified date/time, whether the escrowed payment and NFT are returned to the original
owners.
Level of adherence to the following control objectives can help reveal the extent to which
risks are mitigated in Stage Three, Asset Transfer. Specific control activities to achieve these
objectives will vary based on the unique blockchain implementation:
•

Control Objective #3.1 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that longer-lived
tangible assets that are prone to deterioration are recertified (quality/condition) by an
expert when the asset experiences a significant change and/or prior to a transfer/sale of
the asset, and this recertification is attached to the respective non-fungible token.

•

Control Objective #3.2 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that if an expert is
recertifying the quality/condition of a tangible asset and determines that the tangible
asset should be retired, this status is attached to the respective non-fungible token and/or
the token is burned.

•

Control Objective #3.3 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that only authorized
network participants or oracles (1) verify the transfer of a tangible asset and (2) submit
evidence of this event to the smart contract used to transfer the asset’s non-fungible
token.

•

Control Objective #3.4 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that network
participants validate the transfer of a tangible asset using approved forms of evidence.

•

Control Objective #3.5 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that network
participants must reach the required level of consensus on a tangible asset’s transfer
before the smart contract will transfer the asset’s non-fungible token.

•

Control Objective #3.6 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that the smart contract
used to enable the transfer is configured to simultaneously release the payment and nonfungible token when the required conditions are met. Otherwise, the payment and nonfungible token are returned to their original owners.
22
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See the appendix for the framework that maps these control objectives to risk considerations, and
Figures 2 and 3 for an example of a tangible asset moving through Stage Three, Asset Transfer.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Stage Four – Asset Retirement
Asset retirements identified as part of a recertification process were discussed in Stage
Three, Asset Transfer, but there will also be instances in which an asset should be retired outside
of a formal recertification event. While asset owners should take responsibility for changing the
status of an asset to retired on a blockchain, they might also have a motive to avoid declaring this
status because it is a signal that an asset no longer has value in an exchange. As such, retirement
processes should specify how often to evaluate an asset for potential retirement, how owners
make retirement records available on a blockchain, how to attach a retirement record/status to an
NFT, and whether/how to burn an NFT upon retirement.
Level of adherence to the following control objective can help reveal the extent to which
risks are mitigated in Stage Four, Asset Retirement. Specific control activities to achieve this
objective will vary based on the unique blockchain implementation:
•

Control Objective #4.1 – Controls provide reasonable assurance that if a tangible asset
has reached the point of retirement outside of a transfer or recertification event, this
status is attached to the respective non-fungible token and/or the token is burned.

See the appendix for the framework that maps this control objective to risk considerations.

IV. RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
Several research opportunities emerge from issues examined in this study:
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1. What should be considered sufficient evidence to validate the creation or sale/transfer of a
tangible asset?
Researchers familiar with the auditing profession have an opportunity to study the
evidence necessary to validate the creation or sale/transfer of a tangible asset, knowing that
blockchains will likely be subject to audits and auditing standards (e.g., PCAOB Auditing
Standard No. 1105, Audit Evidence). One way to approach this issue might be to study the
objectivity/neutrality of different observation methods (i.e., a device is more
objective/neutral than a human observer) and rank the desirability of available methods. Such
a study would need to consider the risk that devices used to witness these events are prone to
attacks from bad actors (e.g., cyberattacks), and could examine the impact of requiring
multiple forms of evidence (e.g., human and device witnesses) to validate transactions.
2. Should permissioned blockchains include a segregation of specific duties?
Internal control environments should include a segregation of duties (SoDs), and
require specific separations between those with the ability to authorize transactions, record
transactions, and maintain custody of the underlying assets (Turner, Weickgenannt, and
Copeland 2016). With public and permissionless blockchains (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum),
participants do not need to trust one another in order to trust the underlying repository, and
any user is free to submit new transactions, verify/validate transactions, vote in the consensus
to approve new transactions, and maintain a copy of the repository. Here, a participant can
have all three duties that are often intentionally kept separate, as the blockchains are large
enough that a single participant could not submit a fraudulent transaction and then have
meaningful influence on recording the transaction or custody of the related asset (due to
widespread validation and consensus). In contrast, permissioned consortium blockchains
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have fewer participants, meaning individual actions have more influence on the
appropriateness of recorded transactions. With consortium blockchain SoDs, researchers can
study the appropriateness of (1) the abilities maintained by individual participants within a
member organization, as well as (2) the abilities maintained across participants from the
same member organization (i.e., a member organization’s collective abilities). Such a study
can inform which duties should be kept separate at both a participant and member
organization level (e.g., the ability to submit a transaction, but then not validate it nor
participate in its consensus vote). This study could also reveal whether a lack of SoDs in
blockchain consortia presents a meaningful risk to the reliability of the underlying repository.
3. How will discrepancies between the physical world and blockchain repository be resolved?
In discussing the consortium’s charter, this study calls for a process to resolve
discrepancies between the physical world (i.e., possession of a tangible asset) and blockchain
(i.e., control of an asset’s NFT). However, it remains unclear how this resolution process
should be defined. For example, should the party in physical possession be required to
deliver an asset to the owner of record per blockchain, or should the owner per blockchain be
required to send the NFT to the party in possession of the tangible asset? If the owner per
blockchain refuses to release the NFT, should certain participants be allowed to force this
transaction, or does that level of centralized power go against the very purpose of having a
blockchain in the first place? Further, who legally owns the asset when there are
discrepancies, and what happens when these parties are in different countries with different
laws?
4. How should blockchain interface with downstream internal reporting systems?
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While this study focuses on maintaining reliable blockchain data, participants and/or
member organizations will likely need to incorporate this data into downstream internal
reporting systems (Sheldon 2019). Currently, no widespread agreement exists on how to
extract, transform, and load blockchain data to other reporting systems, making this area ripe
for future research. One solution involves manually accessing assets/balances in a digital
wallet (or by using a block explorer), copying and transforming this data, then loading it to
the target system. Another solution involves using a smart contract or decentralized
application (Dapp) to collect details on specific assets/balances in a format that can be easily
extracted, transformed, and then loaded elsewhere. A robotic process automation (RPA) task
could also be used to extract specific data, transform it, then automatically load it to target
systems. Finally, an application programming interface (API) could be developed specific to
the consortium blockchain and downstream internal reporting system. With any of these
solutions, controls must be in place to ensure data remain complete and accurate.
5. What are immediate challenges for assets that are processed, assembled, or divisible?
When combining component parts that each have an NFT, a smart contract can burn
the component NFTs and mint a new NFT to represent an assembled asset. However, current
NFT standards (i.e., those available for the Ethereum blockchain, such as ERC-721) do not
work in the reverse direction, and thus NFTs are not designed to allow an assembled asset’s
NFT to be disassembled back into its component NFTs (Ethereum Foundation 2022). 30 Ways
to disassemble an asset’s NFT back into its component NFTs represents an area for future
examination and collaboration among researchers and practitioners. One solution to this issue
might be to not burn the component NFTs but rather attach them to the newly assembled
Still, participants can view the record of a smart contract minting the assembled asset’s NFT, which should show
the component NFTs burned in the process.

30
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NFT, which then maintains control over the component NFTs. This way, should a component
need to be removed (e.g., selling a salvageable engine from an otherwise destroyed car), the
owner of the assembled NFT could remove the component NFT and transfer it to a new
owner. In doing so, the provenance of a component NFT would remain intact and show any
instances in which it was attached to, or removed from, an assembled NFT.
As a related issue, some assets undergo processing before reaching an intended form.
For example, minerals might be processed into metals, while cattle might be divided into
various cuts of beef. Future research can address when various assets are at a viable point to
be tracked with an NFT and who should create the NFT. In doing so, it will be important to
consider whether the party that creates the NFT has incentives to record the asset’s
provenance correctly (e.g., the counterfeit fish market), and whether the blockchain is set up
to provide an audit trail to investigate any instances of fraud or tampering.
6. What are possible next steps in evaluating blockchain for assurance/attestation purposes?
Relying on a consortium’s permissioned blockchain involves relying on multiple
participants to consistently apply agreed-upon policies and procedures (as defined in the
consortium’s charter). Current auditing standards from both the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) do not address this level of inter-company dependence, and instead focus largely
on intra-company risks and controls. 31 Today, a firm that relies on another firm’s processes
often obtains a system and organization control (SOC) report, which is the output of a
specific type of engagement performed under the AICPA’s Attestation Standards. SOC

In fact, Appelbaum, Cohen, Kinory, and Stein Smith (2022) suggest that an impediment to blockchain adoption is
a lack of specific rules or guidance from parties like the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), PCAOB, and AICPA.

31
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reports have evolved to address emerging issues in the audit/attest space. For example, the
AICPA recently released a SOC for Cybersecurity engagement (AICPA 2022a), which can
be augmented by the AICPA’s Trust Services Criteria (i.e., security, availability, processing
integrity, confidentiality, and privacy) to provide a more wholistic evaluation of a firm’s IT
environment. The AICPA also recently released a SOC for Supply Chain engagement
(AICPA 2022b), which provides a mechanism for interdependent firms to communicate risks
and controls that might impact other supply chain members and stakeholders. This study
provides the foundation for a SOC-like engagement specific to tracking tangible assets with
blockchain that can also be augmented by existing frameworks (e.g., the AICPA’s Trust
Services Criteria) and/or used as a reporting mechanism for multiple interdependent firms
(e.g., SOC for Supply Chain). If consortium blockchains like the one in this study follow a
SOC-like attestation path, research will need to address how many (or which) consortium
participants must receive such an evaluation before the entire blockchain can be relied upon
from an audit standard setter perspective (i.e., the AICPA and PCAOB).
7. What are potential scaling issues with a permissioned blockchain used to track tangible
assets?
A permissioned blockchain like the one described in this study could quickly expand
and encounter scaling issues, making it difficult to manage and maintain. As more assets are
tracked and more parties participate, one possible solution is to create side chains to track
unique assets. Here, pre-determined parties could act as full-nodes and access administrators
to validate transactions and ensure access is only granted to parties with verified and
authorized identities. Access administrators could also ensure each participant only creates
one account to help prevent any single user from moving assets within their own accounts to
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create an artificial market for an asset. Each side chain could track and manage a specific
asset, which includes components that ultimately become part of a larger assembled asset on
a higher-level blockchain. For instance, a blockchain used to track the provenance of ACME
truck engines might include side chains for component parts such as valves and pistons, thus
providing a more manageable mechanism to track the various parts and parties involved. In
doing so, each side chain would need to address the risks outlined in this study. Researchers
can consider the implications of scaling issues with a permissioned blockchain like the one
described in this study, and further evaluate the potential use of side chains as a viable
solution. 32

V. CONCLUSION
This study examined the use of blockchain to track the ownership and provenance of
tangible assets through four stages, including (1) design and governance of a blockchain, (2)
asset creation, (3) asset transfer, and (4) asset retirement. In doing so, the study proposes a
framework of risks and control objectives to evaluate the reliability of a permissioned blockchain
used by a consortium to track tangible assets. Here, reliability should increase when a consortium
addresses more of the identified risks and implements controls to achieve the proposed control
objectives. Finally, the study concluded by suggesting research opportunities related to the use of
blockchain to track tangible assets, including (1) what evidence blockchain participants need to
validate the creation or sale/transfer of a tangible asset, (2) are segregation of duties necessary on
permissioned blockchains, (3) what happens when blockchain and the physical world are not in
agreement, (4) how should blockchain interface with downstream reporting systems, (5) what are

32

I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the use of side chains to address scaling issues.
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immediate challenges for assets that are either assembled or divisible, (6) what are possible next
steps in evaluating blockchain for assurance/attestation purposes, and (7) what are potential
scaling issues with a permissioned blockchain used to track tangible assets.
The processes, risks, and control objectives discussed in this study can be used as a guide
to evaluate the reliability of a consortium’s permissioned blockchain to track the ownership and
provenance of tangible assets. By design, these blockchains are tailored to meet specific needs of
a consortium, and as such, many variations of these blockchains will ultimately exist, thus
making it impractical to develop an overly specific framework for their evaluation. Still, the
processes, risks, and control objectives presented herein should apply across most variants of
these blockchains and the various types of tangible assets they would be used to track. Unique
scenarios will emerge and asset tracking technologies will evolve, but the topics addressed
should remain applicable as a baseline for evaluation purposes.
This study is subject to several limitations. To begin, it does not demonstrate or evaluate
the framework in a live setting (i.e., Phases 4 and 5 of the DSRM). Further, there is limited
information available on how current blockchains accomplish tangible asset tracking, and
emerging details might change how specific components of the presented process work. Next,
this study only speaks to a few types of asset ID tags and IoT devices, and acknowledges that
these are entire fields of study in their own right. Future research can consider a broader range of
ID tags and IoT devices, and how these might help address open issues or concerns. Finally, this
study focuses on tangible assets that are directly attached to an ID tag, as risk of separation
increases when tags are attached to packaging or shipping containers. Future research can
examine ways to mitigate risks of separation.
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Table 1
Mapping of Design Science Research Methodology (Geerts 2011) to Current Study
DSRM Activities
(Geerts 2011)
Problem
identification and
motivation

Activity Description
(Current Study)
Problem:
Blockchain can be used as the record of tangible asset ownership and provenance,
but the extant research does not offer a framework to evaluate the extent to which
blockchain serves as a reliable repository for tracking tangible assets.

Knowledge Base
(Current Study)
Firms are investing in permissioned consortium blockchains (AICPA and CPA Canada
2017) and shifting their focus from cryptocurrencies to business applications
(Stratopoulos, Wang, and Ye 2021), including the ability to track the ownership and
provenance of tangible assets.

Motivation:
Blockchain users might rely on incorrect information from a technology labeled a
“truth machine” (Casey and Vigna 2018). However, a blockchain deemed reliable to
track tangible assets can provide strong support for (1) an asset’s origin and
authenticity, (2) an owner’s claim to the asset, and (3) key accounting
documentation about an asset (e.g., purchase date and cost) (Hoare 2015).

Today, owners typically maintain the only record of an asset, and any subsequent buyer
must trust that record (or exert their own effort to validate the seller’s claims). Blockchain
introduces the potential to provide a complete provenance of an asset that has been
verified, validated, and agreed-upon by key stakeholders.

Define objectives of
solution

The reliability of blockchain to serve as a record of tangible asset ownership and
provenance can be solved/clarified by examining the process of tracking tangible
assets with blockchain, then creating a framework of risks and control objectives
relevant to each stage of the asset’s life (i.e., creation, transfer, and retirement).

• Knowledge of blockchain functionality and limitations, as discussed in Section II,
Background
• Knowledge of a tangible asset’s typical lifecycle, including its creation, transfer, and
retirement
• Knowledge of the role of control objectives to address risk, as informed by the
AICPA’s Attestation Standards, including AT-Cs 105, 205, and 320

Design and
development

This study examines four stages of tracking tangible assets using blockchain,
including (1) design and governance considerations, (2) asset creation, (3) asset
transfer, and (4) asset retirement. The study then develops a framework of risk
considerations and control objectives that can be used to evaluate the reliability of a
blockchain to track the ownership and provenance of tangible assets.

Same as described in the “Define objectives of solution” phase

Demonstration

This study does not provide a demonstration of its framework in a live environment.

Evaluation

This study does not evaluate its framework in a live environment. However, a Big-4
practitioner working on that firm’s blockchain product provided suggestions on
ways to improve the framework, which are incorporated in the final version. Key
open issues with the framework also appear in Section IV, Research Opportunities.

Communication

Writing this study accomplishes communication.

The ways in which this study is informed by, and extends, recent research on blockchain
in the accounting domain appears in Section II, Background.

35

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3669326

Figure 1
Example of Stage Two, Asset Creation*

Assume a drone manufacturer produces a new unit. Upon completion the manufacturer attaches an RFID tag to the drone that records the official product name,
serial number, model, and RFID tag reference. An authorized neutral party observes (verifies) the drone being built at a specific production facility, scans the
RFID tag to collect product details, submits evidence about the creation and product details to the blockchain, and specifies the smart contract being used to mint
the drone’s NFT. Blockchain participants then review the provider and submitted evidence to determine whether the creation is valid (per the consortium
charter). Once reaching consensus on a valid creation, the specified smart contract mints the drone’s NFT and assigns it key details about the drone (e.g., RFID
tag reference, serial number, and creation date). Finally, the RFID tag and other devices used to track and monitor the drone are regularly serviced.
* Numbers appearing in 10-point stars are control objectives (as defined in the study and listed in the appendix) that relate to the associated part of the asset
creation stage.
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Figure 2
Example of Stage Three, Asset Transfer*

Assume the drone from Figure 1 is sold to a new owner. Prior to the sale, an authorized expert (per the consortium charter) recertifies the quality/condition of the
drone and attaches this recertification to the respective NFT. An authorized neutral party then observes (verifies) the physical transfer of the drone, submits
evidence about the transfer to the blockchain, and specifies the smart contract being used to transfer the drone’s NFT. Blockchain participants then review the
provider and submitted evidence to determine whether the transfer is valid (per the consortium charter). Once reaching consensus on a valid transfer, the
specified smart contract releases the NFT to the buyer and payment to the seller (see Figure 3 for further smart contract details).
* Numbers appearing in 10-point stars are control objectives (as defined in the study and listed in the Appendix) that relate to the associated part of the asset
transfer stage.
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Figure 3
Detail on Use of Smart Contract in Sale of Tangible Asset

Note that in either outcome (i.e., two events on the furthest right), both the tangible asset and its NFT reside with a single owner.
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APPENDIX
Summary of Control Objectives and Risks Considerations when using Blockchain to Track Tangible Assets1
Control Objective Description
CO #
(Controls provide reasonable assurance that…)
Stage One – Design and Governance Considerations
1.1
… the consortium has a charter in place that is
agreed to by all original and subsequent network
participants and member organizations. The
charter should address technical details about the
blockchain and any relevant processes used to
support blockchain operations.

Risk Considerations
As part of initiating a blockchain consortium, the originating member organizations should develop and agree to a charter that includes key
technical details about the blockchain and the processes used to support the operation of the blockchain. Any subsequent member
organizations should also be required to adhere to the charter. For purposes of this study, the most relevant technical details and processes to
define in the charter include:
Technical Details:
- What types of permissioned access rights exist on the blockchain (e.g., verify the occurrence of events/transactions, submit transactions,
validate transactions and participate in the consensus to add transactions to the repository, and/or maintain a copy of the blockchain
repository)?
- Which network participants may possess certain permissioned access rights (or combinations of permissioned access rights)?
- Which oracles are allowed to provide the blockchain with exogenous data (or what are the criteria for selecting an oracle)?
- What are the acceptable forms of evidence to verify and validate the creation/transfer/retirement of a tangible asset?
- What is the minimum level of consensus required to record events/transactions to the blockchain repository?
- What attributes must be assigned to each non-fungible token used to represent a tangible asset (e.g., asset name, asset identification tag,
serial/model number, creation date, creation location, picture, etc.)?
- Which attributes of a non-fungible token are visible to network participants and which attributes remain private to specific parties?
- What data standards must be followed when assigning/attaching information to non-fungible tokens (i.e., for interoperability purposes)?
Supporting Processes:
- What is the process to provision permissioned access rights (i.e., request, approve, and implement), and who has the authority to request,
approve, and/or implement these access rights?
- What is the process to design, test, and implement smart contracts? Who has the authority to approve and deploy new smart contracts?
- What is the process to retire smart contracts that are no longer used/relevant?
- When should smart contracts be audited, how should they be audited, and who may perform these audits?
- What is the process to recertify the quality/condition of a tangible asset and attach this recertification to the respective non-fungible token
(including who is allowed to perform recertifications for different assets)? Note that recertification can be performed as part of a periodic
valuation assessment of the asset, when there is a major change to the asset, and/or when the asset is about to be transferred/sold. Additional
considerations include:
• How is the recertification expert identified (and agreed to by the seller and buyer if recertification is part of a transfer/sale)?
• Is the recertification performed by an expert that is credentialed to perform the task?
• What happens if the owner/seller/buyer disagrees with the expert’s conclusion that the asset qualifies as recertified?
- What is the process to resolve discrepancies between the physical world (i.e., who possesses the tangible asset) and the blockchain (e.g.,
who controls the tangible asset’s non-fungible token)?
- What is the process to amend the original consortium charter, including how many member organizations must approve such changes?

1.2

… the (level of) permissioned access granted to
network participants remains appropriate.

Permissioned abilities should be reviewed for reasonableness, while also considering the processes implemented to address:
- How the permissioned access rights of new network participants are authorized and granted
- How changes to permissioned access rights for existing network participants are authorized and granted/removed
- How the permissioned access rights of terminated network participants are removed
Following risks/practices should be considered:
- Is there a concentration of higher-power permissioned access (e.g., voting in the consensus) shared among too few network participants?

39

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3669326

- Do network participants maintain higher-power permissioned access than necessary to perform a role (e.g., it might not be appropriate for
network participants that provide certification records to vote in the consensus)?
- Should network participants with permissioned access to verify the creation or sale/transfer of a tangible asset be restricted from other
permissions, such as submitting this transaction to the blockchain or participating in its consensus vote?
- Should network participants with permissioned access to validate the creation or sale/transfer of a tangible asset (i.e., participate in its
consensus vote) be restricted from other permissions, such as submitting this transaction to the blockchain or verifying the transaction?
1.3

… smart contracts deployed to the blockchain are
subject to a formal design, development, testing,
approval, and release process.

Smart contracts may be used for critical events on the blockchain, such as minting non-fungible tokens and acting as an escrow agent that
holds the buyer’s and seller’s assets as part of an exchange agreement. Once deployed, smart contracts are difficult to modify, and once
executed, the resulting movement of assets is nearly irreversible. As such, any smart contract deployed on the consortium blockchain should
be subject to a robust design, development, testing, approval, and release process. This applies whether the smart contact will be used for a
single event such as a sale, or used for many events such as the minting of non-fungible tokens.

1.4

… smart contracts are retired/blocked when they
are no longer applicable to the consortium’s
operations.

As operations change, it is likely that legacy smart contracts will need to be replaced by new smart contracts that are more tailored to the
current environment. By calling smart contracts that are no longer relevant, users are exposed to the risk that the smart contract does not
adhere to current regulatory/contractual agreements and that assets might be transferred to an unintended party. As such, there should be a
process in place to either block smart contracts that are no longer relevant or to maintain a listing of smart contract addresses that should no
longer be called.

Stage Two – Asset Creation
2.1
… when a tangible asset is created, it is attached
to a secure asset identification tag that uniquely
identifies the tangible asset.

- Considering the need to uniquely identify the asset, is an appropriate asset identification tag used to convey the information stored on the
tag (e.g., barcode, QR code, RFID/near-field communication tag)?
- Has the asset identification tag been attached to the asset in a way that it cannot be inappropriately removed (or would such tampering be
evident and flagged)?
- What safeguards have been implemented to ensure the data stored/presented on the asset identification tag cannot be inappropriately
modified or copied and placed on another asset identification tag (e.g., spoofing an RFID tag)?

2.2

… only authorized network participants or
oracles (1) verify the creation of a tangible asset
and (2) submit evidence of this event to the smart
contract used to mint the asset’s non-fungible
token.

- Which network participants and oracles are authorized to verify the creation of a tangible asset and submit evidence of its creation?
- How is the creation of the tangible asset observed, and is this persuasive in the unique circumstances? Evidence of this observation might
include one or more of the following:
• A live or recorded video of the creation
• A neutral third party observing the creation
• Live observation of the creation by network participants
- How is this observation communicated to the blockchain (i.e., does the device used to observe the transaction interface directly with a
blockchain node, or does the observation get communicated through an intermediary that should also be evaluated for security purposes)?
- Are the devices used to observe the transaction protected from unauthorized access or use (i.e., physical access to the device and logical
access to its data and software)?
- How do the smart contract parties ensure that details of the physical creation are routed to the correct smart contract?

2.3

… network participants validate the creation of a
tangible asset using approved forms of evidence.

- What forms of evidence submitted to the blockchain are network participants allowed to use in order to validate the creation of different
types of tangible assets?
- How are network participants forced to use approved forms of evidence in order to validate the creation of a tangible asset?

2.4

… network participants must reach the required
level of consensus on the tangible asset’s creation
before the smart contract will mint the asset’s
non-fungible token.

- Given the number of network participants that vote in the consensus and the type(s) of evidence required to validate the creation of the
tangible asset, it would be appropriate to revisit:
• Is a lower-level of required consensus offset by requiring higher quality and/or more objective forms of evidence?
• Are lower-quality and/or less objective forms of evidence (as used in validation) offset by requiring higher levels of consensus?
- How does the smart contract that mints the asset’s non-fungible token enforce the required level of consensus (as defined in the charter)
among authorized network participants that the tangible asset has been created before minting the non-fungible token?
• Any failure to enforce this consensus could result in the minting of unauthorized non-fungible tokens.

40

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3669326

2.5

… the smart contract accurately assigns all
required attributes to the non-fungible token upon
its minting (e.g., asset name, identification tag
number/reference, serial/model number, creation
date/location, and picture).

- What attributes about the tangible asset does the smart contract require prior to minting its non-fungible token? For example:
• Asset name
• Asset identification tag reference
• Serial/model number
• Creation date/location
• Picture of the asset
- How does the smart contract ensure that the required attributes are accurately recorded and assigned to the non-fungible token?
- Details about the tangible asset’s inception will be more prone to error or inaccuracies the longer it takes to assign these attributes to the
non-fungible token, potentially leading to challenges in defending the asset’s authenticity at a later point in time.
- In certain situations, it might be appropriate to obtain records of licenses, inspections, and/or certification of the manufacturing plant or
other origin of the asset to further demonstrate the authenticity of the asset (and attach these records to the respective non-fungible token).
• What party is responsible for submitting these licenses/inspections/certifications to the blockchain (or is responsible for making this
information available to authorized network participants upon request)?
• How are any licenses/inspections/certifications attached to the specific non-fungible token?

2.6

… the asset identification tag is serviced
regularly. If the tag must be replaced, the legacy
tag is decommissioned and the new tag is
associated with the respective non-fungible
token.

- How long is the asset identification tag expected to be in service as compared to the expected useful life of the tangible asset?
- What procedures have been implemented to ensure the asset identification tag is routinely serviced before it becomes unreadable due to
damage or loss of power (i.e., if the tag is active and has its own power source)?
- What procedures are in place to replace the asset identification tag if it becomes unreadable, and how will the new tag be associated with
the respective non-fungible token?
- What are the procedures in place to retire the legacy tag, such that it is completely decommissioned (i.e., so it does not later send out signals
after being replaced)?

2.7

… IoT devices used to track tangible assets
adhere to the same controls as asset identification
tags, and also maintain secure network
connectivity, data storage, and configurations.

Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices used to track different aspects of the tangible asset (e.g., location, orientation, and surrounding
temperature/humidity) should adhere to the same considerations as provided in Control Objectives 2.1 and 2.6. Furthermore, the following
risks/practices should also be considered:
- For IoT devices with network interface capabilities, what safeguards have been implemented to protect the device from the risks and threats
faced by other internet-connected devices (e.g., cyberattacks, loss of control of the device, unauthorized changes to stored data)?
- How have IoT devices been configured to capture the intended occurrence?
- What measures have been taken to ensure the IoT device stores data securely?
- How does the IoT device transmit collected information completely and accurately to an intermediary device or directly to the blockchain?

Stage Three – Asset Transfer
3.1
… longer-lived tangible assets that are prone to
deterioration are recertified (quality/condition) by
an expert when the asset experiences a significant
change and/or prior to a transfer/sale of the asset,
and this recertification is attached to the
respective non-fungible token.
3.2

… if an expert is recertifying the
quality/condition of a tangible asset and
determines that the tangible asset should be
retired, this status is attached to the respective
non-fungible token and/or the token is burned.

- Is there a recertification of the longer-lived tangible asset when a significant change is made to the asset and/or prior to any sale/transfer of
the asset in accordance with the consortium’s charter?
- What party is responsible for uploading the recertification record to the blockchain (or is responsible for making the recertification
available to authorized network participants upon request)?
- How is this recertification record/status attached to the respective non-fungible token?
- What party is responsible for uploading the retirement record to the blockchain (or is responsible for making the retirement record available
to authorized network participants upon request)?
- How is this retirement record/status attached to the respective non-fungible token, and does this burn (i.e., destroy) the non-fungible token?
- If the expert determines that the asset should be retired, is this status submitted to the smart contract used to facilitate the exchange and thus
trigger the return of the payment and the non-fungible token to their original owners (and possibly burn the non-fungible token in the
process)?
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3.3

… only authorized network participants or
oracles (1) verify the transfer of a tangible asset
and (2) submit evidence of this event to the smart
contract used to transfer the asset’s non-fungible
token.

- Which network participants and oracles are authorized to verify the transfer of a tangible asset and submit evidence of its transfer?
- How is the transfer of the tangible asset observed, and is this persuasive in the unique circumstances? Evidence of this observation might
include one or more of the following:
• A live or recorded video showing the delivery of the tangible asset to a specific location/party
• A neutral third party observing the sale/transfer
• Live observation of the sale/transfer by network participants
• The recipient scanning the asset’s ID tag to acknowledge possession
• A GPS device attached to the tangible asset showing it arrived at a specific location
- How is this observation communicated to the blockchain (i.e., does the device used to observe the transaction interface directly with a
blockchain node, or does the observation get communicated through an intermediary that should also be evaluated for security purposes)?
- Are the devices used to observe the transaction protected from unauthorized access or use (i.e., physical access to the device and logical
access to its data and software)?
- How do the smart contract parties ensure that the results of the physical transfer are routed to the correct smart contract?

3.4

… network participants validate the transfer of a
tangible asset using approved forms of evidence.

- What forms of evidence submitted to the blockchain are network participants allowed to use in order to validate the transfer of different
types of tangible assets?
- How are network participants forced to use approved forms of evidence in order to validate the transfer of a tangible asset?

3.5

… network participants must reach the required
level of consensus on a tangible asset’s transfer
before the smart contract will transfer the asset’s
non-fungible token.

- Given the number of network participants that vote in the consensus and the type(s) of evidence required to validate the transfer of the
tangible asset, it would be appropriate to revisit:
• Is a lower-level of required consensus offset by requiring higher quality and/or more objective forms of evidence?
• Are lower-quality and/or less objective forms of evidence (as used in validation) offset by requiring higher levels of consensus?
- How does the smart contract that transfers the asset’s non-fungible token enforce the required level of consensus (as defined in the charter)
among authorized network participants that the tangible asset has been transferred before releasing the non-fungible token?
• Any failure to enforce this consensus could result in the unauthorized transfer of non-fungible tokens.

3.6

… the smart contract used to enable the transfer
is configured to simultaneously release the
payment and non-fungible token when the
required conditions are met. Otherwise, the
payment and non-fungible token are returned to
their original owners.

- How is the smart contract set up to collect sufficient payment from the buyer and the correct non-fungible token from the seller?
- What is the trigger event for the smart contract to release the payment to the seller and the non-fungible token to the buyer (see Control
Objective 3.3 for evidence to determine whether this event happened)?
- When does the trigger event need to happen by?
• What happens to the payment and non-fungible token held in escrow if the trigger event does not occur (or is not reported to the smart
contract) by this time?

Stage Four – Asset Retirement
4.1
… if a tangible asset has reached the point of
retirement outside of a transfer or recertification
event, this status is attached to the respective nonfungible token and/or the token is burned.

- What processes are in place to determine whether the tangible asset should be retired?
- How does the owner upload the retirement record to the blockchain (or make the retirement record available to authorized network
participants upon request)?
- How is this retirement record/status attached to the specific non-fungible token, and does this cause the non-fungible token to be burned
(i.e., destroyed)?

This table is structured in the format used by Sheldon (2021) for Table 1. The final framework benefited from feedback provided by a Big-4 practitioner who is
currently working on designing and implementing that firm’s blockchain product.
Note – Any references to “smart contracts” in the above Control Objectives and Risk Considerations should be considered interchangeable with “decentralized
applications” (or Dapps), which are applications on a blockchain built by combining several smart contracts. Furthermore, all Control Objectives are novel to
using a blockchain to track tangible assets, other than Control Objectives #2.1 and #2.7, which were included to more fully demonstrate how risks related to
existing technologies/processes need to be addressed when using blockchain in this manner.
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